Recently Liang et al. propose an interesting privacy-preserving ciphertext multi-sharing control for big data storage mechanism, which is based on the cryptographic primitive of anonymous multi-hop identity based conditional proxy re-encryption scheme AMH-IBCPRE. They propose a concrete AMH-IBCPRE scheme and conclude their scheme can achieve IND-sCon-sID-CCA secure (indistinguishable secure under selectively conditional selectively identity chosen ciphertext attack). However, our research show their scheme can not be IND-sCon-sID-CCA secure for single-hop and multi-hop data sharing. Also in 2014, Liang et al. propose an interesting deterministic finite automata-based functional proxy reencryption scheme DFA-based FPRE for secure public cloud data sharing, they also conclude their scheme can achieve IND-CCA secure (indistinguishable secure under chosen ciphertext attack), we also show their scheme can not be IND-CCA secure either. For these two proposals, the main reason of insecurity is that part of the re-encryption key has the same structure as the valid ciphertext, thus the adversary can query on the decryption oracle with this part of the re-encryption key to get secret keys, which will break the CCA-security of their scheme. We give an improved AMH-IBCPRE scheme and an improved DFA-based FPRE scheme for cloud data sharing and show the new schemes can resist our attack and be CCA-secure. We also demonstrate our improved AMH-IBCPRE scheme's efficiency compared with other related identity based proxy re-encryption schemes, the results show our scheme is almost the most efficient one.
Introduction
Nowadays cloud computation and big data are very hot research topics. Cloud computation can be seen as a paradigm of aggregating many various kinds of computation resources and storage resources into very powerful computation grids. There are many advanced techniques to support the smooth running of cloud computation like mapreduce, hadoop, vmvare etc [8, [35] [36] [37] [38] [39] . Big data mainly refers to the burst generation of massive data sets everytime/everywhere/everyspace, which is a very common scenario these days, it mainly concerns on how to organize and process data efficiently. If we use traditional data management or knowledge discover techniques, many useful results can not be obtained, thus it is a challenge on how to organize/store/process big data.
Let us focus on one of the most basic challenge for big data, that is, how to secure and scalably store these large amount of data. Cloud computation is such a promising technique. Data owners first outsource datum to the cloud servers to reduce the local management overhead. They often worry about the security and privacy if directly outsourcing their data sets to the cloud, thus it is often a practice that the data owners first encrypt datum and then upload them to the cloud [18] [19] [20] [21] . But this time scalability is a new problem, can these encrypted data be shared efficiently and scalably? Aiming at solving this issue, Blaze et al. [5] and Atenesis et al. [3, 4] proposed a new notion called proxy re-encryption (PRE), which allows the proxy with re-encryption key can transform the original ciphertext associated with a public key to the re-encrypted ciphertext associated with another public key.
In proxy re-encryption(PRE), a proxy can transform ciphertexts for Alice to ciphertexts for Bob without the proxy knowing either Alice or Bob's private key and the underlying plaintexts. PRE has very important applications for secure cloud storage and its sharing [32] [33] [34] . CCA-security (chosen ciphertext secure) is an important security notion for proxy re-encryption, which means that the schemes can resist the attacking even with adaptive decryption oracle [6, 7, 14, 15, 24, [26] [27] [28] [29] [30] [31] . Multi-hop PRE refers the scheme can support ciphertexts being able to be re-encrypted again, while single-hop PRE has no this ability. For the users' secret keys or the underlying plaintexts can not be induced by the proxy, this primitive can be used for efficiently and scalably sharing encrypted contents for multi-users in cloud. The cloud servers can be acted as proxy and transform the ciphertexts for the users, otherwise the data owner has to first download his data sets and then re-encrypt them, which is very inefficient. Conditional proxy re-encryption (CPRE) aims at more flexible re-encryption for PRE, which can only re-encrypt the ciphertexts which satisfying some condition. Multi-hop identity based conditional proxy reencryption (MH-IBPRE) [9, 16] combines the feature of identity based encryption (IBE) with CPRE, which simultaneously has the advantage of no relying on public key infrastructure, supporting fine-grained re-encryption and multi-hop ciphertext transformation. However, directly using MH-IBPRE in multi-sharing control for big data storage may leak the identities of the users, and thus break the user's privacy. Therefore, Liang et al. exploited to use anonymous MH-IBPRE (AMH-IBCPRE) scheme to achieve the privacy persevering property when sharing data among multi-users. Fairly to say, their work give an interesting solution on the issue of how to secure share data storage efficiently and scalably in big data era. Unfortunately, the authors claimed their scheme can achieve IND-sCon-sID-CCA security, but we show their scheme can not be CCA-secure.
The traditional proxy re-encryption schemes or conditional proxy re-encryption can not easily achieve fine-grained delegation, although attribute based proxy re-encryption schemes can achieve more flexible delegation than PRE etc, but most of them can only be proved to secure under chosen plaintext secure in the selective model. Furthermore, almost all existing ABPRE schemes only support access policy assembling with AND gates and fixed size inputs, which is less expressive than the access policy assemble with AND, OR gates and NOT, and access policy expressed by regular languages with arbitrary size which supporting unlimited input size. Therefore, Liang et al. [17] first proposed the notion of deterministic finite automata-based functional proxy re-encryption, which combines the feature of DFA-based functional encryption with proxy re-encryption. The re-encrypted ciphertext can only be decrypted if and only if the delegatee's deterministic finite automata accepts the string associated with the re-encrypted ciphertext. Really this is a novel notion and generalize the concept of proxy re-encryption to a very widely extension. They also proposed a concrete DFA-based PRE scheme and claimed it is fully CCA-secure in the standard model. Fairly to say, this is an interesting and foundational work, but unfortunately, we show their scheme can also not achieve CCA-security by exploiting some shortcoming of the form of their re-encryption keys.
Cloud Storage and Chosen Ciphertext Security
Chosen ciphertext security is a very important security notion for encryption in cryptographic society, and now it is considered as the gold standard for evaluation of the encryption schemes' security. Also it is very important for cloud storage, Figure 1 demonstrates several chosen ciphertext attacks on the cloud storage, which shows that secure cloud storage also should achieve this gold security notion.
1. Assume the attacker is the malicious cloud, it can launch the chosen ciphertext attack on the data owners. First the data owner outsources his datum to the cloud by first encrypting and then uploading the ciphertexts, after that some day when the data owner want to retrieve his data, the cloud maliciously return the modified ciphertexts to him, and he will decrypt the modified ciphertexts and find the decrypted results are not correct. The data owner will notify the cloud on this error, and thus the cloud can utilize this information to launch the chosen ciphertext attack. 2. The malicious cloud can also launch the chosen ciphertext attack on the data users.
First the data owner shares his datum with other data users via proxy re-encryption. The cloud, which is the proxy for implementing the proxy re-encryption, can easily launch the chosen ciphertext attack. When the proxy re-encrypts the original ciphertext to be an encrypted ciphertext, it sends the incorrect re-encrypted ciphertexts to the data user, the data user decrypts the incorrect re-encrypted ciphertexts and will find they are incorrect. He will return the error information to the cloud, and thus the cloud can utilize this information to launch the chosen ciphertext attack.
Our Contribution
In this paper, we concentrate on how to achieve secure functional proxy re-encryption scheme for cloud data sharing. We first analysis the multi-hop identity based conditional proxy re-encryption scheme and the deterministic finite automata-based functional proxy re-encryption scheme proposed by Liang et al. The main advantage of these schemes is its very flexible delegation and thus more fine-grained delegation on the decryption of ciphertexts for other users. Actually we think these concepts are very promising and deserved further exploiting. Unfortunately, we find flaws in their protocols, which result their proposals can not be CCA-secure. We also give an improved AMH-IBCPRE scheme and an improved DFA-based PRE scheme which can resist the attack and be CCAsecure.
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Proxy re-encryption Cloud Fig. 1 . Cloud storage and chosen ciphertext security
Organization
We organize our paper as the following. In section 2, we review Liang et al.'s AMH-IBCPRE scheme, then we demonstrate the attacks to show it can not achieve IND-CCA security in section 3. In section 4, we give an improved AMH-IBCPRE scheme and roughly evaluate its security and performance. In section 5, we review Liang et al.'s DFA-based PRE scheme, then we show the attacks to demonstrate their scheme can not achieve IND-CCA security in section 6. In section 7, we give an improved DFA-based PREscheme and roughly evaluate its security. We conclude our paper in the last section.
Review the AMH-IBCPRE Scheme

The Concrete Scheme
The definition and security model of AMH-IBCPRE can be found in [16] , here we just review their concrete construction. The scheme consists of the Setup, Extract, Enc, ReKeyGen, ReEnc, Dec algorithms as the following:
first be used to hash the conditions and identities which could be arbitrary length. Run BSetup(1 k ) to get (q, g,ĝ, G 1 , G 2 , G T , e) with input parameter k. Denote ω ∈ Z * q as a condition. α, β, γ, δ 1 , δ 2 , δ 3 , η ∈ R Z * q are randomly chosen, computes as a CCA-secure one-time symmetric key encryption. Choose a sUF one-time signature scheme (Sig.KG, Sign, V er) and let its verification key K v in Z * q . The master public key is
(Sig.KG, Sign, V er)) and the master secret key is
The validity of the secret key can be checked as:
Chooses a one-time signature key pair 
rk ω,IDi→ID i can be computed as:
, rk where ID i , ID i ∈ Z * q and l ∈ {1, · · · , poly(1 k )}.
5.
ReEnc(rk ω,IDi→ID i , C l,IDi,w ). If l = 1, (a) Verify
(b) Choose a one time signature key pair
10 , C
12 , C
13 )) and C 2,ID i ,w = (δ (1) , C
13 , C
14 , C 
output ⊥, if Eq. (2) and (3) do not hold. proceed otherwise.
(b) Choose a one time signature key pair , rk
Output ⊥ if Eq. (4) and (5) do not hold. Proceed otherwise.
(e) As in the previous steps, compute θ (j)
Fig. 2. Attack by querying the decryption oracle
Attack I Here we give the first attack on the IND-sCon-sID-CCA property, which can be seen in Figure 2 . Note in this attack the delegator, delegatee and proxy are all uncorrupted. The main strategy is the following: the adversary just modifies the re-encryption key to be a valid ciphertext C 1 attack (which can be assumed at l level), then he queries this ciphertext to the decryption oracle (which can be assumed at 1 level) to get secret value θ (l) 1 . Note here C 1 attack is not a derivative of C * . By using this value, he can derive the delegator's secret key and thus can easily find the plaintext corresponding to C * , which breaks the IND-sCon-sID-CCA property. Concretely, the attack can be described as following:
1. Assume the challenge identity and condition are (ID * i , w * ) and the challenge first
2. The adversary first queries the re-encryption key generation oracle with input
for the l hop, and he will get the re-encryption key as following:
, rk
3. Now the adversary can extract a valid ciphertext from this re-encryption key, which is
This ciphertext has exactly the same structure as the first level ciphertext! 4. The adversary query this ciphertext to the first level ciphertext decryption oracle of ID i , which will return θ (l) 1 . Note here the adversary does not need to corrupt the delegatee ID i , he just use his decryption oracle! 5. After obtaining θ (l) 1 , the adversary can easily compute the partial private key of ID * i , which is enough to decrypt the challenge first level ciphertext:
6. He decrypt the challenge ciphertext as following: [Dec, C ( , , ,
And And
Fig. 3. Another attack by querying the decryption oracle
Attack II Here we give the second attack on the IND-sCon-sID-CCA property, which can be seen in Figure 2 . Note in this attack the delegator, delegatee and proxy are all uncorrupted. The main strategy is similar as the first attack except the adversary modifies the challenge ciphertext to two valid ciphertexts. Concretely, the adversary first just modifies the re-encrypted challenge ciphertext C * (which can be assumed at l + 1 level) to be another ciphertext C 1 attack and C 2 attack which are valid original ciphertexts (which can be assumed at l level), then he queries this ciphertext to the decryption oracle (which can be assumed at l level) to get secret value θ (l) 1 and θ (l) 2 . By using these value, he can derive the delegator's secret key and thus can easy find the plaintext corresponding to C * , which breaks the IND-sCon-sID-CCA property. For this attack is similar with Attack I, here we omit the details. "Uncorrupted Delegation Chain. Suppose there is a delegation chain under w from ID i to ID j (i.e. w|ID i → · · · → ID j ). If there is no corrupted identity in the chain, it is an uncorrupted delegation chain, else it is corrupted."
Then we review the part about uncorrupted delegation chain in the IND-sCon-sID-CCA security model "In this phase, the followings are forbidden to issue:
We think this security model is too strong. In this model, the challenge delegator can only lie in the uncorrupted chain. In the multi-hop setting, this means there can be no corrupted delegatees after the challenge delegator even these delegatees are far away from the delegator, which is obviously contradict our intuition in the multi-hop proxy re-encryption settings. In this section, we try to give a new improved scheme which can resist our attack. The idea is the following: let the original ciphertext, part of the re-encrypted ciphertext and part of the re-encryption key have different forms, then our attack can no longer work again. In particular, we just modify the signature structure in the original ciphertext, the re-encrypted ciphertext and part of the re-encryption key based on Liang et al.'s scheme [16] . Concretely, we let
13 )). In this way, the original ciphertext, part of the re-encrypted ciphertext and part of the reencryption key shall have different forms and can not be used by the adversary improperly. Concretely, our improved scheme is the following: 
and output the 1-st level ciphertext
where ID i ∈ Z * q , m ∈ G T and w is implicitly included in the ciphertext. 4. ReKeyGen(ID i , sk IDi , ID i , ω): The same as the original scheme. 5. ReEnc(rk ω,IDi→ID i , C l,IDi,w ).
-If l = 1, (a) Verify
2 ∈ R Z * q and a one time signature key pair
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6. Dec(sk IDi , C l,IDi,w ).
-If l = 1, (a) Verify Eq. (6). If Eq. (6) does not hold, output ⊥, otherwise, proceed. (b) Compute But there is a crucial difference, in our scheme
which is not the same structure as part of the re-encryption key rk (l)
Note here C 0 = K v , and the part of the re-encryption key can be successfully decrypted by querying to the decryption oracle only if the adversary successfully forge a signature F orgedSignature = Sign(K (l) s , (rk 1 0 (l) , rk which is not possible, due to the security of one-time signature and the tight connection between rk (l) 9 and K (l) v as following: Table 2 . Note here we do not compare our improved scheme with Liang et al.'s scheme for the two schemes almost share the same efficiency, but their scheme can not be CCA-secure while our scheme can. To be fair, we just compare onesingle hop of our scheme with the GA07B scheme (the second scheme in GA07) [9] , the LZD + 10 scheme [13] and the WCW10 [25] scheme, which are all CCA-secure identity based proxy re-encryption schemes. Note in the performance evaluation analysis below, we just compare the length of the ciphertext overhead, not including the plaintext length in the total ciphertext length. Fig. 6 . Encryption cost Fig. 7 . Checking cost Fig. 8 . Re-encryption cost Notations: In Table 2 , encryption is denoted as Enc, re-encryption is denoted as Reenc, decryption is denoted as Dec, ciphertext is denoted as Ciph and ciphertext length is denoted as Ciph-Len, t p , t e and t me represent the computational cost of a pairing, a modular exponentiation and a modular multi-exponentiation in G 1 , respectively in type-I bilinear group(G 1 = G 2 ). t p , t e , t e and t me represent the computational cost of a pairing, a mod-ular exponentiation in G 1 , a modular exponentiation in G 2 and a multi-exponentiation in G 1 respectively in type-III bilinear group(G 1 = G 2 ). t se , t sd and t sv represent the computational cost of once symmetric encryption, once symmetric decryption and once symmetric checking decryption results' validity. t s and t v represent the computational cost of a one-time signature signing and verification respectively. |G| and G T | denote the bit-length of an element in groups G and G T respectively for type-I pairing, |G 1 |, |G 2 | and G T | denotes the bit-length of an element in groups G 1 , G 2 and G T respectively for type-III pairing. |SE| denotes the bit length of once symmetric encryption. Finally, |vk| and |s| denote the bit length of the one-time signature's public key and a one-time signature respectively. Fig. 9 . First level decryption cost Fig. 10 . Second level decryption cost
To further demonstrate our schemes efficiency, we roughly evaluated our scheme's practical performance according to implementation in [1] . We give the performance comparison results for GA07B, LZD+, WCW and Our schemes in Fig. 6,7 ,8,9,10, 11, 12 , according to the efficiency benchmark of SS156 and BN256 groups [1] implemented in the highly efficient RELIC cryptographic toolkit version 0.4 [2] (using the GMP library [12] for big number operations and the default configuration options for prime field arithmetic ), measured on a standard workstation, which is 2.4GHz Intel Core i5 processor and 8GB of RAM (1067MHz DDR3) running Mac OS X Lion version 10.7.5. We have neglected some operations such as the computation cost of one-time symmetric encryption, one-time symmetric decryption and one-time checking for the decryption results' validity, one-time signature and verification. From Fig. 6,7,8,9 ,10, we can see our scheme is the most efficient scheme for encryption, checking, re-encryption, second-level ciphertext decryption and first-level ciphertext decryption. From Fig. 11, 12 , we can see our scheme is a little inefficiency on the ciphertext length compared with some other schemes. Considering our scheme have many interesting properties while others do not have, we think this is not an essential shortcoming.
Review of the DFA-based FPRE Scheme
The definition and security model of DFA-based FPRE can be found in [17] , here we just review their scheme. . The P P is (e(g, g) α , g, g ab , g 0 , z, h 0 , h start , h end , h k , ∀ δ∈Σ h δ , OT S, SY M, H 1 , H 2 ) along with the descriptions of G and the alphabet Σ. The M SK is (g −α , X 3 ), where X 3 is a generator of G p3 . 2. KeyGen(M SK, M = (Q, T , q 0 , F ):The description of M includes a set Q of states q 0 , · · · , q |Q|−1 and a set of transitions T where each transition t ∈ T is a triple (x, y, δ) ∈ Q × Q × Σ. q 0 is designated as a unique start state and F ⊆ Q is the set of accept states. The algorithm chooses D 0 , D 1 , · · · , D |Q|−1 ∈ R G p1 (associating D i with q i ), for each t ∈ T , it chooses r t ∈ R Z * N , ∀q x ∈ F it chooses r endx ∈ R Z * N , and chooses a u ∈ R Z * N . It also chooses R start1 , R start2 , R start3 , R t,1 , R t,2 , R t,3 , R endx,1 , R endx,2 ∈ R G p3 and a r start ∈ R Z * N . The algorithm constructs the key as the follows. First it sets:
For each t = (x, y, δ) ∈ T the algorithm sets:
For each q x ∈ F it computes:
Finally the key is ), ∀q x ∈ F (rk endx,1 = K H1(y) endx,1 · h vx end , rk endx,2 = K H1(y) endx,2 · g vx ) (b) Run rk 4 ← Encrypt(P P, ω, y), and finally output rk M →w = (M, rk 1 , rk 2 , rk 3 , rk 4 , ∀t ∈ T (rk t,1 , rk t,2 , rk t,3 ), ∀q x ∈ F (rk endx,1 , rk endx,2 )) 4. Encrypt(P P, ω, m): Choose s 0 , s 1 , · · · , s l ∈ R Z * N , run (ssk, svk) ← KeyGen(1 n ) and constructs CT as following. First set C m = m · e(g, g) αs l , C start1 = C 0,1 = g s0 , C start2 = (h start ) s0 , C start3 = (g svk 0 h 0 ) s0 , for i = 1 to l set C i,1 = g si , C i,2 = (h wi ) si z si−1 , finally set
The original ciphertext is
(a) If V erif y(ssk, (C end4 , (ω, C m , C start1 , C start2 , C start3 , (C 1,1 , C 1,2 ), · · · , (C end1 , C l,2 ), C end2 , C end3 ))) = 1
and e(C start1 , g svk 0 h 0 ) = e(g, C Start3 ) proceeds; otherwise, output ⊥. (b) CT is associated with a string ω = (ω 1 , · · · , ω l ) and the re-encryption key rk M →ω is associated with a DFA M = (Q, T , q 0 , F ) where ACCEP T (M, ω). There must exist a sequence of l+1 states u 0 , u 1 , · · · , u l and l transitions t 1 , · · · , t l where u 0 = q 0 and u l ∈ F and for i = 1, · · · , l, we have t i = (u i−1 , u i , w i ) ∈ T , the proxy re-encrypts CT as follows. i. If first computes A 0 = e(C start1 , rk 1 ) e(C start2 , rk 2 ) −1 = e(g, D 0 ) s0H1(y) ii. For i = 1 to l, it computes:
Since M accepts w, we have that u l = q x for some q x ∈ F and A l = e(g, D x ) s l H1(y) . iii. It sets A end = A l · e(C endx,1 , rk endx,1 ) −1 · e(C endx,2 , rk endx,2 ) · e(C endx,3 , rk 3 ) = e(g, g) αs l H1(y) iv. The proxy sets C 1 = SY M.Enc(H 2 (δ), ξ), C 2 = Encrypt(P P, ω , δ),
where δ ∈ R G T and ξ = (CT ||A end ||rk 4 ). It finally outputs the re-encrypted ciphertext C R = (C 1 , C 2 ). 6. Dec(SK M , CT ): If V erif y(svk, (C end4 , (ω, C m , C start1 , C start2 , C start3 , (C 1,1 , C 1,2 ) , · · · , (C end1 , C l,2 ), C end2 , C end3 ))) = 1 and e(C start1 , g svk 0 h 0 ) = e(g, C start3 ) proceed; otherwise, output ⊥. First compute
For i = 1 to l compute
Since M accepts w, we have that u l = q x for some q x ∈ F and B l = e(g, D x ) s l . Finally compute . (c) Verify e(C start1 , g svk 0 h 0 ) = e(g, C start3 ), Verify (svk, (C end4 , (ω, C m , C start1 , C start2 , C start3 , (C 1,1 , C 1,2 ), · · · , (C l,1 , C l,2 ), C end2 , C end3 ))) ? = 1 If the equations hold, proceed; otherwise, output ⊥. Attack I Here we give the first attack on the IND-CCA property, which can be seen in Figure 13 . Note in this attack the delegator, delegatee and proxy are all uncorrupted. The main strategy is the following: the adversary just modifies the re-encryption key to be a valid ciphertext C attack , then he queries this ciphertext to the decryption oracle to get secret value y. Note here C attack is not a derivative of C * . By using this value, he can derive the delegator's secret key and thus can easily find the plaintext corresponding to C * , which breaks the IND-CCA property. Concretely, the attack can be described as following: 
· · · , (C end1 , C l,2 ), C end2 , C end3 )).
2. The adversary first queries the re-encryption key generation oracle with input ω * , and the re-encryption key oracle runs as following: ∀t ∈ T (rk t,1 , rk t,2 , rk t,3 ), ∀q x ∈ F (rk endx,1 , rk endx,2 )).
3. Now the adversary can extract a valid ciphertext from this re-encryption key, which is rk 4 ← Encrypt(P P, ω * , y) This ciphertext has exactly the same structure as the original level ciphertext! 4. The adversary query this ciphertext to the original level ciphertext decryption oracle with SK M , where M accept ω, and he will get y. Note here the adversary does not need to corrupt the delegatee, he just uses his decryption oracle! 5. After obtaining y, the adversary can easily compute the partial private key, which is enough to decrypt the challenge original level ciphertext:
H 1 (y) ) 6. He decrypts the challenge ciphertext as following: First compute
Since M accepts ω * , we have that u l = q x for some q x ∈ F and B l = e(g, D x ) s l . Finally compute Attack II Here we give the second attack on the IND-CCA property, which can be seen in Figure 14 . Note in this attack the delegator, delegatee and proxy are all uncorrupted. The main strategy is similar as the first attack except the adversary modifies the challenge ciphertext to two valid ciphertexts. Concretely, the adversary first just modifies the reencrypted challenge ciphertext C * to be another ciphertext C 1 attack and C 2 attack which are valid original ciphertexts , then he queries this ciphertext to the decryption oracle to get secret value y. By using this secret value, he can derive the delegator's secret key and thus can easy find the plaintext corresponding to C * , which breaks the IND-CCA property. For this attack is similar with Attack I, here we omit the details.
Our improved DFA-FPRE scheme
Our main idea is to modify the encryption algorithm used in the re-encryption process to be another one, which is not the same as the encryption algorithm used for second level ciphertext generation.
1. Setup(1 n , Σ): Choose g, g 0 , z, h 0 ∈ R G p1 , and α, k, a, b, α end , α end ∈ R Z * N . Set h start = g αstart , h end = g α end and h k = g k , h k = g k . For each symbol δ ∈ Σ, choose a α δ ∈ R Z * N , and set h δ = g α δ . Choose a one-time signature scheme OT S, a one-time symmetric encryption scheme SY M = (SY M.Enc, SY M.Dec), and two hash functions:
The description of M includes a set Q of states q 0 , · · · , q |Q|−1 and a set of transitions T where each transition t ∈ T is a triple (x, y, δ) ∈ Q × Q × Σ. q 0 is designated as a unique start state and F ⊆ Q is the set of accept states. The algorithm chooses D 0 , D 1 , · · · , D |Q|−1 ∈ R G p1 (associating D i with q i ), for each t ∈ T , it chooses r t ∈ R Z * N , ∀q x ∈ F it chooses r endx ∈ R Z * N , and chooses a u ∈ R Z * N . It also chooses R start1 , R start2 , R start3 , R t,1 , R t,2 , R t,3 , R endx,1 , R endx,2 ∈ R G p3 and a r start ∈ R Z * N . The algorithm constructs the key as the follows. First it sets:
Finally the key is
3. ReKeyGen(SK M , ω):
(a) Choose a y ∈ R G T , and v x ∈ R Z * N (for ∀q x ∈ F ) and set rk 1 = K H1(y)
), ∀q x ∈ F (rk endx,1 = K H1(y) endx,1 · h vx end , rk endx,2 = K H1(y) endx,2 · g vx ) (b) Run rk 4 ← Encrypt (P P, ω, y) , and finally output rk M →w = (M, rk 1 , rk 2 , rk 3 , rk 4 , ∀t ∈ T (rk t,1 , rk t,2 , rk t,3 ), ∀q x ∈ F (rk endx,1 , rk endx,2 )). Here the Encrypt (P P, ω, y) algorithm runs as following: Choose s 0 , s 1 , · · · , s l ∈ R Z * N , run (ssk, svk) ← KeyGen(1 n ) and constructs CT as following. First set C m = m · e(g, g) αs l , C start1 = C 0,1 = g s0 , C start2 = (h start ) s0 , C start3 = (g svk 0 h 0 ) s0 , for i = 1 to l set C i,1 = g si , C i,2 = (h wi ) si z si−1 , finally set
The ciphertext is
4. Encrypt(P P, ω, m): Choose s 0 , s 1 , · · · , s l ∈ R Z * N , run (ssk, svk) ← KeyGen(1 n ) and constructs CT as following. First set C m = m · e(g, g) αs l , C start1 = C 0,1 = g s0 , C start2 = (h start ) s0 , C start3 = (g svk 0 h 0 ) s0 , for i = 1 to l set C i,1 = g si , C i,2 = (h wi ) si z si−1 , finally set C end1 = C l,1 = g s l , C end2 = (h end g ab ) s l , C end3 = (h k ) s l C end4 = Sign(ssk, (ω, C m , C start1 , C start2 , C start3 , (C 1,1 , C 1,2 ), · · · ,
The original ciphertext is CT = (svk, ω, C m , C start1 , C start2 , C start3 , (C 1,1 , C 1,2 ), · · · , (C l,1 , C l,2 ),
(C end1 , C l,2 ), C end2 , C end3 ))) = 1
and e(C start1 , g svk 0 h 0 ) = e(g, C Start3 ) proceeds; otherwise, output ⊥. (b) CT is associated with a string ω = (ω 1 , · · · , ω l ) and the re-encryption key rk M →ω is associated with a DFA M = (Q, T , q 0 , F ) where ACCEP T (M, ω). There must exist a sequence of l+1 states u 0 , u 1 , · · · , u l and l transitions t 1 , · · · , t l where u 0 = q 0 and u l ∈ F and for i = 1, · · · , l, we have t i = (u i−1 , u i , w i ) ∈ T , the proxy re-encrypts CT as follows.
i. If first computes A 0 = e(C start1 , rk 1 ) e(C start2 , rk 2 ) −1 = e(g, D 0 ) s0H1(y) ii. For i = 1 to l, it computes:
A i = A i−1 · e(C i−1,1 , rk ti,1 ) · e(C i,2 , rk ti,2 ) · e(C i,1 , rk ti,3 ) = e(g, D ui ) siH1(y)
where δ ∈ R G T and ξ = (CT ||A end ||rk 4 ). It finally outputs the re-encrypted ciphertext C R = (C 1 , C 2 ). 6. Dec(SK M , CT ): If V erif y(svk, (C end4 , (ω, C m , C start1 , C start2 , C start3 , (C 1,1 , C 1,2 ), · · · , (C end1 , C l,2 ), C end2 , C end3 ))) = 1 and e(C start1 , g svk 0 h 0 ) = e(g, C start3 ) proceed; otherwise, output ⊥. First compute B 0 = e(C start1 , K start1 )e(C start2 , K start2 ) −1 = e(g, D 0 ) s0 . For i = 1 to l compute B i = B i−1 e(C i−1,1 , K ti,1 ) · e(C i,2 , K ti,2 ) −1 · e(C i,1 , K ti,3 ) = e(g, D ui ) si . Since M accepts w, we have that u l = q x for some q x ∈ F and B l = e(g, D x ) s l . Finally compute B end = B l · e(C endx,1 , K endx,1 ) −1 e(C endx,2 , K endx,2 ) · e(C endx,3 , K start3 ) = e(g, g) αs l and output the message m = Cm B end . 7. Dec(SK M , C R ):
(a) Run δ ← Decrypt(SK M , C 2 ), compute ξ ← SY M.Dec(H 2 (δ), C 1 ), where ξ = (CT ||A end ||rk 4 ). runs as following If V erif y(svk, (C end5 , (ω, C m , C start1 , C start2 , C start3 , (C 1,1 , C 1,2 ), · · · , (C end1 , C l,2 ), C end2 , C end3 , C end4 ))) = 1 and e(C start1 , g svk 0 h 0 ) = e(g, C start3 ) proceed; otherwise, output ⊥. First compute B 0 = e(C start1 , K start1 )e(C start2 , K start2 ) −1 = e(g, D 0 ) s0 . For i = 1 to l compute B i = B i−1 e(C i−1,1 , K ti,1 ) · e(C i,2 , K ti,2 ) −1 · e(C i,1 , K ti,3 ) = e(g, D ui ) si . Since M accepts w, we have that u l = q x for some q x ∈ F and B l = e(g, D x ) s l . Finally compute B end = B l ·e(C endx,1 , K endx,1 ) −1 e(C endx,2 , K endx,2 ) · e(C endx,3 , K start3 ) = e(g, g) αs l and output the message m = Cm B end .
(c) Verify e(C start1 , g svk 0 h 0 ) = e(g, C start3 ), Verify (svk, (C end4 , (ω, C m , C start1 , C start2 , C start3 , (C 1,1 , C 1,2 ), · · · , (C l,1 , C l,2 ), C end2 , C end3 ))) ?
= 1
If the equations hold, proceed; otherwise, output ⊥. But there is a crucial difference, in our scheme rk 4 ← Encrypt (P P, ω, y) and C end1 = C l,1 = g sl , C end2 = (h end g ab ) sl , C end3 = (h k ) sl , C end4 = (h k ) sl C end5 = Sign (ssk, (ω, C m , C start1 , C start2 , C start3 , (C 1,1 , C 1,2 ), · · · , (C end1 , C l,2 ), C end2 , C end3 , C end4 )) which has not the same structure as the ciphertexts outputted by the Encrypt algorithm C end1 = C l,1 = g s l , C end2 = (h end g ab ) s l , C end3 = (h k ) s l C end4 = Sign(ssk, (ω, C m , C start1 , C start2 , C start3 , (C 1,1 , C 1,2 ), · · · , (C end1 , C l,2 ), C end2 , C end3 )) that means, part of the re-encryption key can not be used to recover y by querying to the decryption oracle. Thus the above described attack can not be launched.
Conclusion
In this paper, we show two recently proposed proxy re-encryption schemes are not chosen ciphertext secure, the reason why their schemes can not be CCA secure is that the adversary can easily extract valid original level ciphertext from the re-encryption keys or the re-encrypted ciphertexts, while these extracted ciphertexts are not the challenge original level ciphertexts, neither the derivatives of challenge ciphertexts. We also propose a new CCA-secure AMH-IBCPRE and a CCA-secure DFA-based FPRE system and roughly analysis their security.
